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International Data Privacy Laws and the        
Protectors of Privacy 
ILMR Editors* 
Abraham L. Newman’s Protectors of Privacy1 provides a stirring 
review of past and present international data privacy laws. 
Throughout the detailed historical narrative of global privacy laws, 
Newman analyzes not only the causes of change that brought about 
new laws, but also the effects the laws have had and will have in the 
future on individuals, governments, and businesses. His central 
theme is how the organization of businesses and politics affects data 
privacy laws and regulations—specifically the central role that 
intragovernmental and intergovernmental regulatory bodies, the 
“protectors of privacy,” play in shaping privacy protection in Europe 
and throughout the world. 
I. WHY PRIVACY LAWS MATTER 
Newman opens his book by discussing how nations and 
businesses within those nations regulate vast amounts of personal 
information, including social security numbers, credit card purchases, 
website history, mobile phone logs, and even biometric data.2 For 
example, Wal-Mart must manage its more than 460 terabytes (460 
trillion bytes) of customer data—twice as much data as is housed on 
the entire Internet.3 Although most nations have established some 
sort of data privacy regime under which businesses and governments 
operate, those regimes are imperfect. Identity theft and fraud alone 
cost U.S. consumers more than $50 billion every year.4 
The technological advances allowing for rapid transfer and 
inexpensive storage of large amounts of data, coupled with the 
increasingly large electronic commerce market,5 exacerbates the data 
privacy problem within a state or nation. In addition, these advances 
 
* The ILMR editors responsible for writing and editing this book review include Joshua 
Engel, Lorie Hobbs, Parker Morrill, Devin Wagstaff, and Dorothy Hatch Ward. All five are 
J.D. candidates, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
 1. ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY (2008). The book contains 221 
pages (including extensive notes and a bibliography), and the ISBN is 0-8014-4549-3. 
 2. Id. at 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Estimated at $12 trillion in 2006. 
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may cause international disputes because of the ease with which 
personal information can flow across jurisdictional boundaries.6 
While these disputes have frustrated international trade and business, 
they have also promoted greater cooperation and compromise 
among the world’s superpowers. 
Newman states that privacy policies have implications for 
individual liberties, the powers of state, and the global economy.7 
Individuals should be concerned with the dangers of discrimination, 
surveillance, and other potential abuses of their private information.8 
Governments should be concerned with trade and security issues, 
especially counterterrorism. Businesses should be concerned with 
privacy laws as they directly affect the management of client 
information, especially that of international clients, when it is 
gathered and shared with other businesses and governments. In 
particular, privacy laws may have potentially severe consequences for 
international trade and outsourcing.9 Rather than being just an 
abstract legal concern, Newman says, data privacy laws and 
regulations affect “patterns of information exchange: how individuals 
express their identity, how companies differentiate markets, and how 
governments manage risk.”10 
II. COMPREHENSIVE AND LIMITED REGIMES 
Newman broadly categorizes data privacy regimes used in various 
countries into two groups: comprehensive regimes and limited 
regimes. Comprehensive regimes regulate both the public and 
private sectors, while limited regimes regulate only the public 
sector.11 Newman recognizes the substantial differences in the 
implementation of these two regimes but focuses on the general 
ideologies to demonstrate how the regimes control data. By 
comparing and contrasting comprehensive and limited regimes, 
particularly those of the European Union and the United States, 
Newman identifies the effects of global politics, the factors that lead 
a country toward one regime or the other, and the effect the type of 
regime has on international negotiations. 
 
 6. Id. at 2, 8. 
 7. Id. at 3. 
 8. Id. at 47–48. 
 9. Id. at 3–5. 
 10. Id. at 6. Although this review will mostly be limited to the effects on businesses, a 
large portion of the book deals with effects on governments. 
 11. Id. at 23. 
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Newman suggests that comprehensive regimes limit the 
development of business sectors, citing, for example, the lack of a 
subprime mortgage market in countries with comprehensive regimes. 
He explains that the restrictive data privacy rules prevent lenders 
from (1) identifying high-risk clients and (2) providing customized 
real estate products.12 
Newman finds that businesses in limited regimes rely on self-
regulation and market mechanisms to control the use of personal 
data. Governments in limited regimes impose some oversight of 
certain private sector industries, such as health care and financial 
services, but the oversight is limited.13 Personal data in limited 
regimes is valuable because, upon agreement, businesses can use 
and/or sell that data, especially for marketing purposes and 
consumer profiling. Newman notes that the financial services 
industry earns $17 billion annually from the free flow of 
information.14 The U.S. government is also a major player in the 
information market—just four of the many government agencies 
purchased roughly $30 million worth of information from data 
compilers in 2005.15 
Newman compares and contrasts the effects of the regimes on 
businesses in the United States and the European Union. Companies 
in the United States frequently buy and sell personal information. 
Publicly available information can also be gathered and transferred 
with minimal restrictions on its use.16 On the other hand, E.U. 
countries limit the transfer of personal information, even if obtained 
from public registries. Credit reporting agencies are also more 
restricted. French credit reporting agencies are public sector 
institutions and only provide negative credit information (e.g., 
defaults and bankruptcies). Limiting this profiling under a 
comprehensive regime would impose significant costs on U.S. 
businesses. The information industry estimates that costs would 
increase in excess of $16 billion if a comprehensive regime was put in 
place in the United States.17 Without the collection and distribution 
of positive financial information concerning potential customers’ 
spending habits or investment information, businesses would have to 
 
 12. See id. at 29. 
 13. Id. at 30–31. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 31. 
 16. Id. at 30. 
 17. Id. at 30. 
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adapt their business models and find other ways to focus their 
advertising.18 
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
After introducing his topic and explaining some general privacy 
law principals, Newman begins his lengthy discussion of privacy law 
history. He then details the historical origin of privacy regulation in 
the European Union, which would come to characterize the privacy 
regulation for most of the rest of the world. 
A. Early Privacy Laws 
Newman posits that data privacy concerns began about the same 
time as the arrival of the mainframe computer in the 1970s, when 
scholars began discussing the implications of the new technology and 
data collection.19 As a result, a set of principles called the Fair 
Information Practice Principles was developed and included the right 
to be notified before the collection of the information, the right to 
consent to the further distribution of the information, and the right 
to object to incorrect data.20 
Newman observes that the U.S. policy regarding data privacy 
began when Congress passed the 1974 Privacy Act.21 Industry 
lobbyists quickly pointed out that there had been no problems in the 
private sector that warranted comprehensive rules. Furthermore, 
U.S. President Gerald Ford threatened to veto any bill that 
contained private sector regulation and to further institute public 
sector regulation via executive order if Congress did not enact a 
limited privacy regime.22 Congress therefore adopted a limited 
privacy regulatory regime under pressure from private industry and 
the President.23 Eventually the United States became the strongest 
proponent of limited data privacy regimes. 
B. Creation of Privacy Laws in the European Union 
Newman then proceeds to discuss the creation and evolution of 
the E.U. privacy regime. In the early 1970s, privacy advocates in 
 
 18. See id. at 28–29. 
 19. Id. at 25. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 43, 57. 
 22. Id. at 59. 
 23. Id. at 60. 
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Europe worried that countries without privacy regulations would 
become havens for large banks of personal information.24 Delegates 
from European countries joined forces to find a solution to 
increasing international data sharing. For the next ten years, privacy 
regulation discussions continued and eventually a group of privacy 
experts convened and made recommendations to the Council of 
Europe.25 These recommendations were adopted in the Council of 
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data in 1981. Although some 
European countries ratified the convention, it was not self-executing 
and ultimately failed to produce any comprehensive regulation.26 
Although the European Union was, by and large, indifferent and 
even resistant to private sector privacy controls in the 1980s, a few 
individual countries in Europe did implement private sector privacy 
controls. For example, French and German officials overcame 
opposition to bureaucratic constraints and adopted privacy rules in 
both public and private sectors.27 
Newman theorizes that the acceptance of comprehensive privacy 
laws in the European Union began in response to concerns about 
cross-border data sharing. European countries created a group of 
privacy officials to address these concerns.28 As their influence 
increased, these officials were able to overcome opposition and 
indifference in the European Union. By 1988, eleven European 
countries had agencies to address important issues including safe 
havens created by countries with lax standards and multi-national 
companies engaging in Pan-European data exchange.29 
Newman explains that by the late 1980s, conflicts between 
European nations concerning data privacy were on the rise. He 
notes, in particular, the French data authority blocking the flow of 
personal data to both Italy and Belgium in 1989.30 Other conflicts 
continued to mount, eventually threatening several European 
 
 24. Id. at 83. 
 25. Id. at 84. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 52. Even though Germany was an early adopter of comprehensive privacy 
regulations, Newman rejects the popular belief that countries with fascist histories tended to be 
more sensitive to privacy concerns and more likely to adopt a comprehensive regime. See id. at 
52–54. 
 28. Id. at 87. 
 29. Id. at 87–88. 
 30. Id. at 89–91. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
178 
Community projects.31 
In response to the growing conflicts, the European Community 
formed a committee, consisting of national privacy officials and 
European Commission officials, to draft a privacy directive to 
facilitate uniformity.32 When the draft was released, the industry 
lobbyists pushed for flexibility between national regimes because of 
the high cost of additional compliance in addition to the capital 
already spent on compliance with national rules.33 Finally, in October 
1995 the Council of Ministers and the European parliament adopted 
the Commission’s resolution.34 
Newman explains that the directive required member states to do 
three things: enact legislation for the public and private sectors, 
create an agency to implement and enforce the directive, and ensure 
that countries outside the European Union demonstrate adequate 
privacy protection as a condition of data transfers.35 The directive 
also created several entities to help the European Union and 
individual member states implement the directive’s policies both 
inside and outside of the European Union. The directive resulted in 
harmonized privacy protection within Europe and gave greater 
power to privacy regulators.36 
One of the most important parts of the directive for both 
European and non-European businesses is Article 25, which requires 
European data transfers to be restricted to those countries with 
adequate data privacy laws.37 However, rather than imposing a 
comprehensive regime across the board, as would normally be 
required under Article 25, the United States negotiated the Safe 
Harbor Agreement with Europe whereby U.S. businesses may 
transfer data from their European affiliates as long as the businesses 
comply with E.U. standards. Under the Safe Harbor Agreement, 
U.S. firms must choose to be monitored and enforced by self-
certification or self-regulation. Firms that choose to self-regulate 
agree to abide by certain dispute resolution requirements and 
become subject to the scrutiny of the Federal Trade Commission, 
which monitors the firms’ compliance with their self-regulatory 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 91. 
 33. Id. at 91–92. 
 34. Id. at 93; see also Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
 35. See id. at 93–94. 
 36. Id. at 94–96. 
 37. Id. at 36. 
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agreements. Firms that choose to self-certify must register with the 
European data privacy authority and agree to be regulated by that 
agency. A 2004 study showed that seventy-five percent of U.S. 
multinational firms chose to self-certify.38 Newman shows that the 
European requirements have motivated international businesses to 
take the initiative in developing their own internal privacy 
regulations and promoting privacy enhancing technology 
throughout all of their operations. 
IV. THE SPREAD OF PRIVACY LAWS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSES 
Following an extremely detailed narrative of early U.S. and E.U. 
data privacy laws, the author next explores how and why the 
European Union influenced countries outside of Europe to adopt a 
comprehensive privacy policy.39 The author argues that many 
countries follow the E.U. pattern because of the influence of its 
comprehensive regulatory model for regulating privacy issues, rather 
than its sheer market power. Although he does not discuss each 
country in detail, Newman notes that since the adoption of the E.U. 
regulations “over thirty countries from five continents have moved 
toward adopting comprehensive [privacy] regulations.”40 
Furthermore, a number of countries that “previously regulated only 
the public sector have adopted private sector legislation.”41 
Initially, international resistance to the European Union’s 
comprehensive model was strong and vocal. Nonetheless, Newman 
argues that the E.U. data privacy authorities came to dominate the 
international market as a result of the following four successful policy 
mechanisms: “control over market access, E.U. enlargement, 
centralized negotiating authority, and oversight networks.”42 
A. Controlling Market Access 
Newman notes that the European Union’s market size, 
combined with its regulatory capacity, allows it to project its rules to 
other nations, monitor compliance, and enforce its rules on firms 
participating in the European market. The size of the market alone 
 
 38. Id. at 39. 
 39. Id. at 99. 
 40. See id. at 101–03. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 105. 
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might be enough for many firms to adopt E.U. standards because of 
the costs of non-adjustment.43 
Newman explains that two provisions of the E.U. directive are 
central to controlling market access. Article 25 gives authority to ban 
transfers of personal information from the European internal market 
to nations that fail to enforce adequate privacy protections standards 
and levy fines for violations.44 Article 29 confers authority on a 
Working Party to determine the adequacy of privacy protection in 
other countries, release opinions on such adequacy, make 
recommendations, and interpret directives. The determinations and 
decisions of the Working Party have an influence on privacy 
regulations in other countries.45 
As an example of the impact of the European Union’s market 
access control, Newman notes that in 1999 the Spanish data privacy 
authority investigated a data exchange between Microsoft U.S. and 
Microsoft Iberia.46 The Spanish authority determined that Microsoft 
acted contrary to European data privacy laws and fined Microsoft 
$60,000 for the illegal transfer of Spanish citizens’ personal 
information without their consent.47 
The author further explains that the European Union used 
control of market access to shape regulatory reform in Australia.48 
Australia initially adopted a limited privacy regime in 1988.49 Later, 
in 1997, despite pressure from the European Union to adopt a 
comprehensive privacy scheme, the Australian government ordered 
private industry to develop self-regulating standards instead of 
expanding privacy regulations. Some industry groups, however, 
recognized that Australian self-regulations would have difficulty 
meeting the Article 29 adequacy requirements and would therefore 
isolate Australian business from the European market.50 Bowing to 
these concerns, the Australian government reluctantly enacted 
private sector privacy rules. However, even after Australia introduced 
comprehensive rules, the Article 29 Working Party deemed the 
Australian legislation inadequate and suggested reforms. Yielding to 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 106. 
 46. See id. at 111. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 106–10. 
 49. Id. at 106. 
 50. Id. at 106–07. 
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pressure from privacy advocates who leveraged the threat of E.U. 
sanctions, the Australian government strengthened privacy 
regulations to comply with the privacy directive, pending final 
European Commission approval.51 Although Australian privacy 
regulations are not an exact replica of European rules, market access 
control was critical in moving Australia from a limited to a 
comprehensive regime.52 
Although U.S. companies are not directly subject to the E.U. 
privacy regime, they may be forced to comply in order to conduct 
business in the European Union. Newman notes that although many 
countries have adopted comprehensive privacy policies because of the 
European Union’s market access control, the United States has 
maintained its limited privacy regime. As mentioned above, however, 
in order to comply with the Article 29 Working Party privacy 
adequacy requirements, the United States entered into the Safe 
Harbor Agreement with Europe.53 Thereby, American firms who 
register and agree to the terms of the Safe Harbor Agreement are 
able to store and use private data of European citizens. 
B. Expansion of the European Union and Its Centralized Negotiation 
Authority 
To obtain membership in the European Union, prospective 
countries must demonstrate that their political, economic, and 
regulatory standards comply with E.U. expectations.54 Newman 
explains that the European Union uses the allure of prospective E.U. 
membership as an incentive for potential E.U. countries to adopt 
comprehensive data privacy laws.55 In addition, the European Union 
sends experts to candidate countries to monitor and advise on 
specific aspects of policy reform and implementation.56 These 
requirements are often a bureaucratic barrier to E.U. membership 
and do not necessarily benefit businesses. The author found no 
evidence that industry groups in the prospective countries promoted 
comprehensive privacy legislation.57 Rather, some candidate 
countries have succumbed to E.U. peer pressure and passed privacy 
 
 51. Id. at 109. 
 52. Id. at 110. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 112. 
 55. Id. at 113. 
 56. Id. at 114. 
 57. Id. 
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legislation initiated through programs funded by an E.U. investment 
of over three million Euros.58 
The well-developed regulatory capacity of the European Union 
allows it to act as a centralized negotiation authority. The European 
Union capitalized on this advantage in negotiating the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Initially, privacy rules 
banning data transfers to countries that lacked adequate privacy 
regulations violated GATS. The European Union pushed for a 
privacy exemption, which the United States did not oppose. 
However, after the exemption prevailed, the United States realized 
that privacy rules could hinder international trade. Unable to weaken 
privacy rules because of the GATS exemption, the United States 
softened its position in future privacy negotiations with the 
European Union.59 
C. Oversight Networks 
The European expansion of regulatory capacity gives European 
regulatory institutions the ability to affect behavior in world markets. 
The Article 29 Working Party serves as policymaker by interpreting 
privacy laws and recommending privacy policy changes. The 
Working Party has released over one hundred opinions, which 
although nonbinding, are relied on by national courts as well as 
multinational businesses.60 
The Working Party opinions have influenced the debate over 
online authentication services. For example, following the release of 
a nonbinding Working Party opinion addressing its concern with the 
lack of disclosure about the use of their consumer information in 
online authentication services, Microsoft integrated new privacy 
enhancing features into its online authentication service.61 Similarly, 
in 2007 the Working Party influenced Google to shorten its data 
retention policy from twenty-four months to eighteen months. 
Shortly thereafter, Yahoo and Microsoft followed Google’s lead.62 
Multinational firms comply with Working Party opinions in 
order to avoid litigation or penalties. 63 The changes made by these 
 
 58. Id. at 115. 
 59. Id. at 116–17. 
 60. Id. at 118. 
 61. Id. at 119–20. 
 62. Id. at 120. 
 63. Id. 
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firms are eventually integrated into their global best practices. 64 The 
firms employ professional advisors who bolster the authority of the 
Working Party opinions by advising their clients to follow those 
opinions.65 
The European Union circumvents the need for new legislation 
by influencing firms directly through the Working Party opinions.66 
Working Party officials can avoid the inefficient institutional 
processes of the European Union and “regulat[e] through 
recommendation.”67 If multinational firms desire to compete in the 
European market, they must integrate the Working Party’s decisions 
into their privacy policies, thus demonstrating the European Union’s 
powerful ability to define, monitor, and enforce market rules. 
Businesses and industries must be aware that regulatory agencies 
are exerting a powerful influence on privacy laws and should pay 
attention to the trends established by such agencies. Newman 
implies that by focusing on the above-mentioned four factors—
control over market access, E.U. enlargement, centralized 
negotiating authority, and oversight networks—businesses may be 
able to predict the power that a regulatory agency can exert on a 
particular industry. 
V. CHANGING THE RULES 
After explaining the international spread of E.U. privacy laws, 
Newman explores the limits of the E.U. regulatory authority in non-
market settings in view of recent events.68 Newman illustrates some 
of these limitations in the telecommunications and national security 
debates following terrorist attacks in the United States, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom.69 He concludes that in highly sensitive areas, 
such as national security, the power of transgovernmental regulatory 
bodies diminishes when confronting strong national interests. 
However, these regulatory bodies may still have a place in 
determining policy within individual countries.70 The compromises 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 121. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 123–24. 
 69. Id. at 124. See generally id. at 132–139 (discussing the effects of the war on terror 
on data privacy). 
 70. Id. at 125.  
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also show that data privacy is not an absolute right, but a freedom 
subject to limitation.71 
A. The Telecommunications Debate 
Newman gives a lengthy description of the fierce debate over 
telecommunications data privacy and the qualified victory of E.U. 
data privacy authorities in national security disputes.72 While 
recognizing that E.U. data privacy authorities modified their initial 
proposals, the authorities served as a counterbalance against rules 
that would have substantially eliminated privacy rights. In 1997, and 
again in 2002, E.U. data privacy authorities in Europe pressed for 
regulations that preserved telecommunications data privacy with 
minor exceptions for national security.73 For example, data 
authorities quickly quashed a Belgian proposal for mandatory data 
retention on limited issues.74 It appeared that data privacy advocates 
had successfully defended the individual’s right to privacy against 
national security concerns with only limited concessions. 
However, the terrorist attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom 
during 2004 and 2005 shifted the telecommunications data privacy 
debate from an E.U. trade issue to a national security issue.75 
Ultimately, the European Parliament reached a compromise and 
passed legislation providing for the limited retention of 
telecommunications data for “between six months and two years.”76 
While unsatisfactory, the legislation “limited the use of the retained 
data to issues directly related to international criminality.”77 This 
compromise appeased the E.U. data privacy authorities, but angered 
industry, placing the cost of data retention squarely on industry’s 
shoulders.78 Firms were required to maintain data for government 
use without reimbursement or the freedom to use the data for their 
own marketing or economic benefit.79 
 
 71. Id. at 22. 
 72. See id. at 125–32. 
 73. Id. at 126–27. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 128–29. 
 76. Id. at 130. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
WINTER 2008 Protectors of Privacy 
 185 
B. The War on Terror 
Newman discusses in detail the conflict of U.S. data retention 
laws and E.U. data privacy directives necessitated by terrorist 
attacks.80 Although terrorist attacks in Europe prompted a review 
and ultimately a reform of E.U. data privacy regulations, the changes 
were not as extensive as the reforms made by the United States in 
response to the September 11 attacks.81 
The gap between the U.S. requirements and the E.U. 
regulations resulted in negotiations between the European 
Commission and the United States facilitating the exchange of some 
sensitive data. However, the negotiations limited which agencies 
would have access to the data until a more detailed agreement could 
be reached.82 In December 2003, the European Commission 
renegotiated a compromise with the United States, but according to 
E.U. data privacy authorities and the European Parliament, the 
regulations remained inadequate.83 As a result, the European 
Parliament filed a suit against the European Commission in the 
European Court of Justice, claiming the Commission had 
overstepped its authority. The court ruled that because the issue was 
one of national security and not “internal trade,” the Commission 
violated its authority.84 Following the 2004 ruling, the European 
Commission and the United States reached an agreement in 2007 
that was less protective of privacy than the prior accord.85 
Newman observes that regulatory bodies have strong influence 
and power within the narrow scope of their expertise, but are subject 
to limitations established by the authorizing statute. Regulatory 
bodies lose power and influence when they venture outside of their 
expertise or delegated authority. 
In the same vein, Newman reminds his readers that the 
European Court of Justice and other national courts may yet 
influence the future of data privacy by ruling on the constitutionality 
of the final 2007 agreement.86 The European Parliament is lobbying 
 
 80. See id. at 132–39. 
 81. Id. at 132–33 (explaining that the United States demanded full access to airline 
databases, and a 50 year retention policy, and also threatened heavy-handed penalties backed 
by impressive regulatory power and expertise). 
 82. Id. at 133. 
 83. Id. at 135. 
 84. Id. at 136. 
 85. Id. at 136–37. 
 86. Id. at 138–39. 
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individual parliaments and E.U. data privacy authorities to review the 
legality of the act in light of national constitutions and European 
laws.87 Additionally, Newman predicts that the decision by the 
European Court of Justice will further weaken Europe’s ability to 
shape international regulatory debates.88 
Recent events have shown the volatility and difficulty of 
establishing a global standard for data privacy; therefore businesses 
and industry leaders should pay close attention to the negotiations 
and proposals that will set the stage for the future. Businesses with 
international interests should strongly consider the national and 
transgovernmental laws that may affect data use, retention policies, 
and even business models of their particular industries. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS 
Throughout the book, Newman notes many implications of his 
theories for businesses, individuals, and governments. Although he 
only minimally addresses many relevant issues, such as data privacy 
concerns in China and India, he does make several observations that 
could help businesses, individuals, and governments understand the 
importance of maintaining a historical perspective of international 
data privacy laws. 
Newman perceptively notes that regulation of the international 
market is becoming “the next wave of globalization” and recognizes 
Europe’s powerful voice in such regulation.89 Although Europe’s 
influence in data privacy regulation is strong, the E.U. regulatory 
capacity varies considerably across international business issues.90 
Due to this variation, Newman encourages scholars to assess E.U. 
involvement in international politics and the role of E.U. political 
institutions in shaping international governance.91 
Newman also observes that the regulatory state has “global 
dimensions” and identifies the changing and increasing E.U. role in 
international data privacy laws.92 His research shows a turn from 
positivist governance towards regulatory strategies in Europe.93 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 140. 
 89. Id. at 15–16. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 14–15. 
 93. Id. (explaining that in contrast to Europe, which has increasingly granted more and 
more authority to regulatory bodies, the United States has shied away from regulatory bodies, 
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Newman proposes that his “comparative historical institutional 
research” strategy towards data privacy laws should be used to study 
other aspects of international law.94 
The author compares the effects arising from jurisdictions that 
anticipate new issues with jurisdictions that tend towards reactionary 
measures—i.e., avoiding regulation until disaster strikes. As 
regulatory authorities are not elected and often not closely 
scrutinized by legislative bodies, this lack of oversight raises concerns 
“about democratic accountability and legitimacy.”95 Newman 
illustrates numerous conflicts between limited and comprehensive 
privacy law regimes, even among different comprehensive regimes. 
Globalization often uncovers conflict of laws between countries, and 
there is no supreme authority to determine the proper rule of law. 
Compromises, such as the Safe Harbor Agreement, are imperative to 
allow multinational firms to conduct business in countries with 
conflicting privacy regulations. It has yet to be seen which courts are 
better equipped to resolve conflicting laws and determine whether 
countries will be bound by decisions of foreign courts. Newman 
suggests that continued negotiation, compromise, and judicial review 
will determine the boundaries of privacy law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Newman’s book provides businesses with international privacy 
concerns an excellent review of past and current privacy laws 
throughout the world. The author examines the history of privacy 
regulation in striking detail, offers his theory of why privacy laws 
developed the way they did, and discusses how these laws may 
continue to develop in the near future. Although somewhat limited 
in its contemporary application, Newman’s discussion illuminates 
several concerns that all businesses with an international clientele 
should consider. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viewing them as a form of bureaucracy that unnecessarily interferes with individuals and 
businesses). 
 94. Id. at 17. 
 95. Id. at 151. 
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